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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

GORDON RAVENSCROFT,
Petitioner / Appellee,
vs.

)
)

)
)

BOISE COUNTY, IDAHO, a county organized
under the laws of the State ofIdaho; BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR BOISE
COlJNTY; JAMIE A. ANDERSON, TERRY C.
DAY, ROBERT A. FRY, COMMISSIONERS;
CHERESE D. MCLAIN, Deputy County
Prosecutor; and John Does I-X,
Respondents / Appellants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 39323-2011
Boise County D. C. No. CV -2011-113

)
)

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE

HONORABLE PATRICK H. OWEN
District Court Judge

SUSAN LYNN MIMURA
Susan Lynn Mimura & Associates, PLLC
3451 E. Copper Point Drive, Suite 106
Meridian, Idaho 83642
Telephone: #(208) 286-3140

MICHAEL J. KANE
Michael Kane & Associates, PLLC
1087 West River Street, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: #(208) 342-4545

ATTORNEY FOR
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ATTORNEY FOR
RESPONDENTS / APPELLANTS
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I.
ARGUMENTS IN REBUTTAL

A.

The issue whether a district court has jurisdiction to provide judicial review
of county commissions' at-will employment decisions has always been before
the court.

In the Brief of Respondent, dated

J~ne

6, 2012, footnote 2 suggests that Appellant did not

preserve the argument regarding the conflict of providing judicial review of at-will employment
decisions through the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (lAPA).

It is clear from the court's

record that the employee sought IAPA judicial review of his termination by the Boise County
Commissioners (hereinafter sometimes "County") through his Petition for Judicial Review (R.
3). The issue whether Idaho Code § 31-1506(1) and the dicta in Gibson v. Ada County Sheriff's

Department, 139 Idaho 5, 72 P.3d 845 (2003), established a right of judicial review of county
personnel decisions was specifically raised in the County's Motion to Dismiss (R. 14), the
County's Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (R. 16), the Petitioner's

Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (R. 25, specifically addressed at R. 29), and the
County's Reply Memorandum in Support of

Respondent's Motion to

Dismiss (R. 32,

particularly R. 33), along with the oral argument held before the district court at which this
question was addressed (Appeal Transcript of March 13,2012, hearing, pp. 7-8).

It is clear that this issue was brought to the opposing party and the district court's
attention by the Appellant and is before this court for consideration.

B.

The County's at-will employment decisions are governed by federal
constitutional protections, relevant statute and case law, not Idaho Code §
31-1506(1).

As addressed in the Brief of Appellant, dated May 10, 2012, Idaho case law is clear that
unless an employee is hired pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the
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employment, or limits the reasons for which the employee may be discharged, the employment is
at the will of either party. An at-will employee may be terminated for any (or no) reason unless
the termination violates public policy. Idaho is a "right to work" state, and has been since at
least 1985 when the Idaho legislature adopted Idaho Code § 44-2201.
Idaho appellate courts have repeatedly reaffirmed that a government employee has
certain constitutional protections in continued employment
interest in continued employment.

if the employee establishes a property

If no property interest is established, Idaho case law and

federal constitutional protection simply require oral or written notice of the reasons for
termination, explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present the
employee's side of the story.
By grafting administrative proccdures and judicial revIew to at-will employment
decisions, the court is imposing burdens which have not previously existed. The Idaho Supreme
Court declared in George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385
(1990), that:
The legislature is presumed not to intend to overturn long
established principles of law unless an intention to do so plainly
appears by express declaration or the language employed admits of
no other construction.

Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho at 540,797 P.2d at 1388.
There is no reason to think that the Idaho legislature intended to provide statutory
procedural safeguards for at-will employment relationships when terminated by local county
commissions. The legislature has not declared a policy to protect this narrow type of at-will
employee. Why allow only at-will employees terminated by a county commission to receive
procedural protection? What distinguishes this employee from one terminated by another local
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elected official, i.e., a county sheriff? The Idaho legislature did not expressly declare this to be
its intent when passing Idaho Code § 31-1506.
For almost thirty (30) years, the Idaho legislature and case law have reflected a right to
work state with at-will employment to be the standard and limited judicial review. To interpret
Idaho Code § 31-1506 as providing significant procedural protection to a narrow group of at-will
employees without a clear statement from the legislature that it was the intent to provide such
additional protection cannot be supported.

C.

A terminated employee is not entitled to attorney fees.

Petitioner asks this court to determine that the law is well settled allowing judicial review
of employment decisions by a local county commission and that the appeal was brought or
pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. The Appellant sought (and received)
pennission to appeal the lower court's decision in order to bring attention of the possibly
unintended consequences of this court's apparent dicta and how, ifappJied, it has the potential to
tum district courts into super county personnel commissions in the seven judicial districts.
Asking the court to consider its earlier decisions in light of a specific, active case and
consider how the language used has been interpreted by at least one district court, clearly does
not fall within the provisions of the cited statue and rule and should not be the basis for an award
of attorney fees.
II.

CONCLUSION
Appellant believes that the lower court's decision that Idaho Code § 31-1506 gives a
narrow group of terminated at-will employees greater rights than previously provided by case

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - P. 3

law or statute violates long established principles of at-will employment and does not reflect the
intent of the legislature when adopting this statute.
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant requests the court determine that Idaho Code § 311506 does not confer jurisdiction upon a district court to review a personnel decision by a county
commISSIon.
th

DATED this 20 day of June, 2012.
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

BY:
MICHAEL 1. KANE
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
th

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 20 day of June, 2012, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:

Attornev for Petitioner-Appellee:
Ms. Susan Lynn Mimura
Susan Lynn Mimura & Associates, PLLC
3451 E. Copper Point Drive, Suite 106
Meridian, ID 83642
[Facsimile: #(208) 286-3135 ]
[Email: slm@idahoattys.com]
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U.S. Mail

X

Email

MICHAEL 1. KANE
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